As the rocket climbed, it was detected by the Olenegorskearly warning radar station in Russia. To the radar operators, the rocket appeared similar in speed and flight pattern to a U.S. submarine-launched Trident missile. Russian President Boris Yeltsin was notified immediately and the "nuclear briefcase" used to authorize nuclear launch was automatically activated. No warning was issued to the Russian populace of any incident; it was reported in the news a week afterward.
Russian doctrine reportedly allowed Yeltsin ten minutes from the time of detection to decide on a course of action. Russian observers were quickly able to determine that the rocket was heading away from Russian airspace and was not a threat. Reports differ greatly as to whether or not Yeltsin came close to authorizing an attack, but the general consensus is that Yeltsin was able to conclude that there was no basis for attack, and therefore no danger. The rocket fell to earth as planned near Spitsbergen 24 minutes after launch.
The Norwegian and American scientists had notified 30 countries including Russia of their intention to launch a rocket. The information notification was not efficient, and the information was not passed on to the radar technicians. Following the incident, notification and disclosure protocols were reevaluated and redesigned.
References
Pry, Peter Vincent, War Scare. Praeger Trade, 1999.